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ABS TRACT
A strategic mechanism of price adjustment is introduced to explain
inflations in the U.S. during 1909—1974. The mechanism follows from
our theory that when the profit rate is above a normal—target rate,
competitive forces operate to lower prices while if the profit rate
is below the target a correlated strategy among firms operates to
generate a rise in prices as a strategy to improve profitability. The
notion of "correlated strategy" is adopted from game theory. The
mechanism may operate in harmony or against demand and the net effect
is what we call the "basic inflation." Contrary to a—priori notions of
positive association between inflation rates and profit rates, our theory
proposes a critical test of a negative association between these variables.
Such a relationship is in fact empirically established.
The analysis shows that large and persistent inflationary pressures
are generated by low profitability and during 1971-1977 those accounted
for some 20%—50% of total inflation. These pressures would be present
even if no increase in cost occurs. This suggests that an important
cause of the 1970's inflation is the low profit rate in the private
sector and any public policy against inflation will fail if it does
not aim at the same time to raise the profit rate on private capital.
Professor Mordecai Kurz
Institute for Mathematical Studies
in the Social Sciences








The inflation—unemployment configurations of the 1970's have
created a gap in contemporary macro—economic thinking. The "Phillips
Curve" (see Phillips [1958], Lipsey [1960] and Perry [196111 for the u.s.)
was rejected as a basic analytical and policy tool and with it the
validity of an extensive body of modern thought became questionable.
This has left wide open the task of explaining the observedrelation-
shipbetween unemployment andinflation
Without aiming to review the "Phillips Curve" episode it is
relevant to this paper to clarify some aspects of why this analytical
tool led to unsatisfactory results. To do this we recall thatthe
Phillips curve was developed as a relationship between w(t)/w(t)—
the rate of change of nominal wages and u(t)-the rate of unemployment.




where x(t)) are "other" variables in the wage equation. Although
in many contributions it is not always explicit what the interpretation
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of the Phillips curve is, it should be clear that it represents an
equilibrium condition in the labor market (see, for example, Sainuelson—
Solow [1960], Tobin [1912] andFriedman[1910], [1911]).
In many of the uses-of the Phillips curve a.relationship is
derived between the rate of inflation and the rate of unemployment. To
accomplish this a price determination equation is postulated and this
is usuafly a model based on full—cost pricing. A typical such equation
can be found, for example, in Perry [1966] and is defined by
(1.2) =+ __+ __+ 3K(t)+__
where
r
p (t) =priceof raw materials at t
=anindex of capacity utilization at t
One usually interprets equation (1.2) as an equilibrium condition in the
commodities markets resulting from excess demands in these markets being
equal to 0.
Now in order to obtain the relation between (t)Ip(t) and
u(t) one inserts (1.1) into (1.2) in order to obtain
(1.3) =(u(t),x(t))
where x(t) are "other" variables. Since j(t)Ip(t) as well as r(t)fw(t)
and u(t) are all endogenous variables, one thinks of (1.3) as a
relation between the equilibrium values of the two endogenous variables.—3-..
This relationship depends both on the "other" variables as well as the
random shocks to the system as a whole.
We now note that the "trade—off" between p(t)fp(t) andu(t)
as specified in equation (1.3) can be incorrectly specified due either
to incorrect specification of the Phillips curve (1.1) or the price
formation equation (1.2). Thus the failure of the empirical relation
(1.3) in recent years may be due to either one of these factors. Although
we do not believe that equation (i.i) provides a correct specification
ofthe equilibrium condition in the labor market, we shall not study
this relationshipbetween r(t)/w(t) and u(t) in the present paper.
Instead, we concentrate here on the price formation mechanism (1.2),
'which we believe is an important ingrediant in understanding the process
of inflation, and propose in this paper a reformulation of the mechanism
(1.2). More specifically, in developing our strategic approach to infla-
tion we shall regard firms as adopting equilibrium strater of price
adjustment and equations type (1.2) will provide the equilibrium quan-
titative description of this strater.
A word may be in order about cost—push and demand—pull theories
of inflation. The attempt to establish a causal relation between cost
and inflation or demand and inflation would involve the same set of
problems discussed earlier with regard to the Philips curve: cost, demand
and inflation rate are all endogenous variables and without a theory of
inflation which will define the structural relations among them no useful
causal interrelationships can be discussed.E! With this reservation made,—'i—
weshall argue below that the cost—push demand—pull distinction may
havea classificatory value which is useful.The strategic theory of
inflationwhich we develop here will regard the decision to change
prices as an endogenous decision with explicit structural description.
At different times adeision to raise-prices comes either in
response to increased cost or increased demand andthenit looks
like a cost-push or demand—pull inflation. However, the theory will
explicitlystate the circumstances in which despite rising cost, the
endogenously determined rate of inflation will be less than the corre-
sponding rate of rising cost and perhaps even negative when cost is
rising. Furthermore, circumstances may be specified in which high
demandmay be associated with either rising or declining prices and
in the same way low demand may be associated with either rising or
declining prices. In this sense one can use the cost—push demand—pull
characterization as a classificatory tool of inflationary processes and
with that aid the understanding of the deeper structural explanation
of inflation.
A final introductory note must be related to the methodology
of analyzing inflation, In the context of a general equilibrium system
of market clearing any process of rising prices must be induced by excess
demand causing the "auctioneert' to raise prices. From this view point
the study of inflation must necessarily be the study of those causes
making for general excess demand in all markets which would then cause
the "auctioneer" to raise all prices. When looked at from the auctioneer's
view point the deeper issues cannot be uncovered since many situations—5—
appearto lead to contrasting conclusions: we have manr periods of
recession about which we may think as periods of excess supply in which
prices do rise and we also observe periods of recovery with high
and perhaps excess demand when prices are stable or even falling. What
one discovers is that even in periods of recession a situation of excess
demandmaydevelop in commodity markets and this may lead to rising
prices.This can be caused by the decision by firms to lay—off workers,
reduce output andcutback the supply to avoid losses. This suggests
thatthere may be circumstances in which price targets may be setand
supplies adjusted to them. This would lead to the conclusion that
recessions, in which demand falls, are not necessarily periods of
de—facto excess supplies and recoveries are not necessarily periods
of de-facto excess demand. With this in mind one may conclude that
studying inflation as a process in which the auctioneer raises prices
in response to excess demands is probably not a fruitful way of looking
at the problem. We propose that the study of inflation must shift
attention back to the behavior of firms who make the market. Furthemore,
one must look at inflation as a state in which all firms elect to raise
prices as a rational choice in the given environment. Such a theory
will need to concentrate on those factors which induce all firms to
adopt similar optima]. price change strategies. Inflation, in this con-
text, is an equilibrium strategy adopted by all firms to achieve whatever
goals they cannot achieve without the inflationary strategy.—6—
2. Conrpetition,NormalPrQfits and Correlation of Strategies
2.ä Competition and Correlation of Pricing Strategies
Weview our competitive firm as operating in a dynamic environ-
mentand aiming to maximize its long term profitsby selecingQptimal
output,investment and pricing strategies. The idea of the firm as
a long run profit maximizer is well known and a similar view was adopted
by manywriters (see, for example, Modigliani [1958] and[197T,pages
6—8]). Whatwe shall do here is develop this hypothesis in a strategic
contextof an indefinitely repeating economy andcarryout an empirical
testof the approach.
n optimallong runprofit maximizing strategy is different
from short—term strategy in the fact that the firm must take into
account at any datet not only the state of the world at later dates
but also the futureresponseof the competitors to its currently
chosen actions (at t). This means, for example, that if a firm lowers
its prices at t it must take into account the possible retaliation
ofits competitors both at the present and also in all future market
dates. In a one—period static world no such considerations need be
taken into account since anystrategy adopted by all participants has
a duration of one market period only. It then follows that the essential
nature of a long—term strategy hinges on the fact that the economy
repeatsitself indefinitely often and the market,so to speak, reopens
everyttmorninght or even continuously. As long as we have a finite
numberof firms there does not exist a natural notion of a "small"
firmwhose strategy may be ignored by theothers.-'1 This means that—1—
regardless of how small, in the context of a repeated economy, the
strater of' each firm must be considered by all others and an equilibrium
will consist of a set of optimal long—run strategies adopted by every
firm taking into account the strategies adopted by all the other firms.
The repetition of the economic game enables a great deal of
information to pass implicitly among the participants. This is done
simply through a complex structure of signals which enables the participants
to learn all they need about each other and thus to coordinate their
strategies. This situation has often been viewed as "implicit collusion"
and thus long—term profit maximization was regarded by Modigliani [1958:1
as a reflection of oligopolistic behavior. This conclusion is not
necessary since even in a perfectly competitive economy with a finite
number of firmsimplicitcoordination of strategies may occur andsuch
coordinationdoes not require a "small" number of participants.
The idea of coordination as resulting from the repetitive nature
of the economy has received significant attention in Game Theory(seefor
example,Aumann[1959],Kurz[l977a],Gerard.—Varet andMoulin[1918] and
others).The notion used in Game Theory is one of "Correlated Strategies"
applicable in non—cooperative games of conflict which are repeated. Here
the participants cannot make binding contracts (like in the famous "pris-
oner's dilema") but overcome this non—cooperative limitation by adopting
modes of behavior, or strategies, which signal their desire for cooperation.
The repetition of the game provides ample opportunities both to test
the sincerity of those who signal a desire for cooperation and also to—8—
retaliateagainst those who may double—cross the "honest" participtants.
Thus inan indefinitely repeating game a "correlated strategy't could
constitute an equilibrium which looks as if it were a result of a
completelycollusiveprocess. The stability of such an equilibrium is
derived from the constarrt threat of retaliation by all the participants
against a deviator from the adopted correlated strategy. Such a retalia-
tion may be applied immediately and could continue into the indefinite
future. An important conclusionwhichmust be derived from this theory
is that the extent to which correlated strategies may be adopted depends
upon two essential elements: the perceived gain which can potentially
be enjoyed by all the players and the punishment—retaliation1 ability
of the participatns against any deviator.
As long as free entry to an industry is available the establish-
ment of implicit collusion or "correlated strategy" in competitive
markets do not turn them into oligopolies. However, let us consider
for a moment the effect of fixed entry or exit cost on the nature of
the equilibrium. If there are no such costs then a correlated pricing
strategy may create temporary abnormal profits but free entry with zero
fixed entry and exit cost will keep expanding output and push the. profit
rate down towards its normal level. Thus with zero entry and exit cost
the retaliation ability of the participants is restricted to the gain
from correlation. This can be significant if the profit rate is below
normal and correlated pricing strategy may prevent it from getting even
lower. This means that when the profit rate is above normal the process
of free entry and the expectations that the profit rate cannot stay—9—
abnormally high will act against the formation of correlated pricing
strategies and is likely to result in competitive price cutting.
However if the profit rate drops below normal due to an unexpected
rise in cost or some other factor, the industry will obviously attempt
to make technological or organizational adjustments to improve
its profitability and some firms may leave the industry. However in
addition to these normal competitive adjustments, forces will be set
in motion for the formation of a correlated price increasing strategy
and due to this strategy the profit rate will not be as low as it might
be. Due to the fact that in this case there is no entry and. exit cost,
the retaliation ability of the participants against a deviator is derived
only from the fact that such a correlated strategy is beneficial to all
and a deviation will prove harmful to all.
A more complex case arises when significant entry and exit costs
are present. We note that in our reality of imperfect information and
irreversible investments such costscould be prohibitive. They include
all dimensions of set up cost: legal, financial, locational, labor
andmanagerialtraining, but also allirreversibleinvestments. These
includeinformational development, product advertising, community and
public relations andfinallyall the cost ofspecificplant and
equipmentwhich cannot be transfered costlessly to other industries.
Inmany industries a significant part (if not all) of total invest-
ments falls in these specific categories.
Withfixed entry and exit cost a correlated pricing strategy in
arepeated economy provides the participants a significant retaliatory—10—
tool. This may be used against any new entry or against any deviator
from the accepted pricing policy. Since drastic price cutting can
result in widespread losses which cannot be recovered due to the
specificity of the investments, such circumstances would. have two
consequences: first,no new entrywill occur before the profit rate
goes above a certain level which would provide compensation for the
risk of entry. Second, correlated strategies are more likely to
be established and. have a more stable character due to the high cost,
to all the participants, of a breakdown in the coordinated activity.
We can thus conclude that correlated pricing strategies are more
likely to be formed the lower is the profit rate and the higher are
the costs of entry and exit.
2.b The Normal Profit Rate
The establishment of a correlated pricing strategy is conditional
upon the existence of a well defined set of signals which are clearly
understood. and the interpretation of which is commonly agreed upon.
We proposed above that the position of the actual profit rate R(t)
in relation to the target profit rate R*(t) is crucial to this signal-
ling process. But what is the normal target profit rate R*(t)? Since
this concept is one of the key ideas of this work we must clarify
its meaning.
We are assuming that given the technological conditions of
the economy, the political and legal foundations of property rights,
the availability of resources and the functioning of our institutions—11—
thereis a target after-tax profit rate R* which my be designated
R*(t) which may change over time due to the change in exogenous con-
ditions. Similarly there is a distribution of profit rates R(t)
over industries depending uponthe risk level, the stage of
technological development, the cost of entry and exit and other
characteristics. The after—tax profit rate R*(t), with its
associated industrial distribution R(t), is viewed as a target
rate which firms in the various industries believe they can earn
and will ultimately earn after they have selected their optimal
decision rules and made all the technological and administratiVe
adjustments needed to improve their profitability. The actual after—
tax profit rate R(t) may be above R*(t) or below R*(t) and
the temporary relation between them may reflect all the random
elements in our economic universe in addition to other unexpected
factors. The latter may include sudden changes in the tax laws,
unexpected rise in labor or other input cost, unexpected change in
thepolitical environment resulting in legal restrictions on the
activities of the firms and other restrictions like environmental
requirementswhich may demand capital investments and adjustment time.
The belief in R*(t) can be explained in two separate ways
which are complementary. The first explanation may concentrate on
the long term supply of capital and the rate of technological progress.
These could have combined in modern time to create excess supply of
goods and capital when the profit rate goes above R*(t) and excess—4.2—
demand when it goes below R*(t). Thus based on historical facts it
is perfectly rational to expect the economy to return to it.
To justify this view consider in Diagram 1 a plot of the after
tax gross and net rates of return on capital in the U.S. 19O9—l9'f1.
The mean value are rg1 =5.lt% and =.2%.Note that
the gross rate demonstrates no trend and the major fluctuations
in this rate are due to such unexpected factors as wars and the
depression. The very slight downward trend in the net rate is
probably due to the tax treatment of depreciation.
A second interpretation of R*(t) can be only sketched here.
Itwill start from the hypothesis that both the tax rate and the
after—tax wage rate and rate of return on capital——all are outcomes of
the political andeconomic balance of power in our society. Such a.
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balance of power is reflected in the constitutional rights of the
variouseconomicagents. Thus the target profit rate R*(t) is
simply a reflection of all the economic options constitutionally
available for the employment of private capital. Since the constitu-
tional rights of the agents have changed little during the 20—th
century, the rate of return has not changed either. We may note,
however, the distinct decline in the rates between 1966and 19T14.
2.c The Formation of Pricing Strategy: The Basic Hypothesis
Given the target profit rate R*(t) the firm candefinethe














cost curve with R*(t) built into the costfunction andAC——the
averagecost function associated with a 0 profit. In a completely
stationary environment the strategy of the firm is based on the expecta-
tions that p(t) should be equal to p(t) and output equals to Q.
Along terni equilibrium will in fact determine the number offirms
which willoperate in the industry. Due to fluctuations in productivity
and variations in prices of inputs, the curves AC*(t) and AC(t)
move and the firms continuously adjust product prices so asto respond
to these changes. This means that product price adjustments comeabout
in response to actual or expected changes in profitability: any actual
decline in the profit rate or an expectation for a future decline based
on observed rise in cost initiate the forces whichwill establish a
correlated price increase strategy. Sudden increases in demand may
accelerate the price adjustment process and declines in demand may slow
but not stop it since the process is initiated by long term considerations
rather than the temporary condition of demand. This means that varia-
tions in demand may complement or slow down the basic pricing strategy
initiated by conditions of profitability while part of the changes in
demand will be translated into changes in output level and to changes
in the number of firms in the industry rather than changes in prices.
We return to this key observation below.
If the industry were operating under short term profit maxi-
mization, changes in demand would have caused prices to fluctuate
above p since below this price many firms would close down rather—15—





There areafew arguments why we do not follow this approach
andthesewe discuss now:
(i) The observed facts are that fluctuations in output are
more extensive than fluctuations in prices. This suggests
that the long term strategy of firmsisto select the
pricep*(t) such that as long as demand fluctuations
stay within say Q*andQ**outputwill be adjusted
but prices will remain constant resulting in a mean pro-
fit rateof R*. However if the cost functions move so that
a mean rate R* cannot be attained then prices willbe
adjusted. The most important changes in the cost curves are
caused by changes in taxes, productivity and prices of inputs.
Furthermore, if demand expands beyond Q*firmswill either
allow shortages to develop or expand capacity. Thisis
essentially the Keynesian outlook on the problem andis
shared by such writers as Patinkin [1965] and Tobin
[1972].
(ii) In an industry where price strategies are correlated,
every participant is reluctant to lower pricessince
he might invite retaliation by the other suppliers.Given that it takes time to establish a correlated strategy,
each producer would rather allow small fluctuations in
demand to translate into small variations in output.
(iii) Changing the labor force so as to equate the short term
marginal cost of labor to the wage rate entails extensive
long term cost. First it creates both the cost of recruiting
and also the risk of not being able to obtain the best
workers when the demand for labor expands. But more
important is the fact that by shifting all the risk of
fluctuations in demand to labor, the firm invites long
term hostility and retaliation by labor. By providing
its labor force somewhat greater job security the firm
attains industrial tranquility at the cost measured by
the difference p —pwhich is the amount needed to
pay for this insurance cost. The firm can also diversify
its investments and thus indirectly reduce the needed
premium p -p.This idea of the firm providing the
insurance is fundamentalin the. "Labor Contracts"
literature(seeAzariadis [1975], [1978], Baily [19714],
and Gordon [19114]). According to this approach if workers
are risk averse while firms are risk neutralthen optimal
collective bargaining contracts would favor rigid wages and
fluctuatingemployment. In such anenvironment lowering
priceswithout lowering wages could be used only asa—17—
short term device to get rid of excess inventories and
these appear to be the observed facts.
Having rejected the idea of a rigid short term profit maximization
::strategy:we propose, s the aschypQhs.i. ohis york thttho profit
gap [R*(t) —R(t)] is the basic cause for the formation of correlated
pricing strategy. The rest of this section will clarifythishypothesis
and. for that purpose we shall divide the discussion into two parts:
the first case of R(t) >R*(t)and the second case of R(t) <R*(t).
Case 1: R(t) >R*(t)
In this case the temporary price established in the industry
is p(t) >p*(t).It is important to keep in mind that firms are
price takers but the nature of their price taking depends upon how
firmly a correlated price strategy is established. Under the present
circumstances of abnormal profits there is little chance for a
success of correlation of strategies since there are two forces
operatingin the market: the first is some expansion of capacity
through new entries into the industry andfurtherbuild—up bythose
inthe industry. The. second, and more important factor, is the
realization by all firms that the abnormal profits cannot last very long
and there is insufficient time to establish a correlated pricing
strategy thus each firm would want to use the transition period to
expand its market share. Competition, therefore, will prevent the
establishment of correlated pricing strategy arid cause p(t) to
gradually fall relative to the cost defining AC*.—18—
Inthe circumstances at hand the decline in the relative price
maysimplytake the form of slow or no price increases when costs
are rising unless major declines in demand are experienced. This is
:-sosince in principle- firms are reluctant to lower prices sincechanges-,
areimportant signalsinenenvironment in which a correlatèdprice
strategy is potentially in effect. Under such circumstances price
cuttingmay be interpreted as the unwillingness of a firm to follow a
price raising strategy when the environment will justify it. Furthermore
keeping prices reasonably stable when costs are rising becomes a positive
signal that when in the appropriate environment, the firm will join a
correlated price raising strategy.
Case 2: R(t) <R*(t)
When the profit rate is below target and p(t) <p*(t)firms
know that the danger of new entry is minimal and attempts will be
made to establish strategies to raise prices. This is not a simple
matter since for a correlated strategy to function all firms- have to
recognize that r(t) <r*(t)and this takes time. Furthermore
since no firm would wish to lose its market share the movement from
p(t) towards p*(t) will be slow particularly since p*(t) is
moving through time. The critical observation which we make can be
stated. as follows:
The lower is R(t) relative to R*(t) the greater
is the incentive of all firms to cooperate and ad—here to a correlated strategy of raising prices and
the more rapid will be the rate at which prices will
be raised toward p*(t).
Note that in Diagram 3 when p(t) <p*(t)the firmsmaybe
operating at a level of say q1. If the price is raised to p2(t)
the firm may retain the lower output with a much improved profit
inargin6/' on its capital stock. When R(t) <R*(t)for the industry,
some firms may elect to lower their capacity or leave the industry
rather than sustain the lower profit rate. Those who stay and improve
their profitability by raising prices may be viewed as price takers
in the sense of adhering to a fixed strategy of raising prices which












construct a model like the one we are describing here and derive the
equilibrium strategies which will be followed underalternativecondi—
tions of the profit gap [R*(t) —R(t)I.Here we shall treat this as
the key empirical question to be resolved by the data and such a formula-
tion will be presented in the next section.
We can thus conclude the description of our hypothesis by
specifying its two components:
(1) For fixed level of productivity and input prices the
larger is the profit gap R*(t) —R(t)when R*(t) >
themore likely it is that a correlated strater
of price increase will be formed and the faster would
prices be raised.
(2) Apart from the actual profit gap firms will consider
the potential or predicted profit gap due to rising
cost relative to productivity. Our hypothesis is that
the more negative this gap becomes the more likely is a
correlated strategy to form and the more rapidly would
prices be raised.
Again we need to emphasize that a firm adhering to a correlated
price strategy is a price taker. Clearly what is the mechanism for
actually raising prices and. who is the first who raises prices is
besides the point. The mechanism may be based on some random process
in response to which all would raise prices; or the price increase
may occur in response to a rise in the price of some input which will,—21--
somehow, trigger a product price above what can be explained by the
rise of cost. With this in mind it is useful to examine the rela-
tionship between our "Basic Hypothesis" andthecost-push demand—pull
explanations for inflation.
Perhaps the simplest way of putting it is to say that our
hypothesis implies that holding allotherfactors constant a higher
inflation rate is caused by lower profitability. Thus there are two
iniporantimplicationsto be kept in mind:
(1) If a rise in cost occurs it will be associated with
more than a proportional increase in prices when
profitability is low and less than a proportional
increase in prices when profitability is high. When
the profit rate is high, rising cost may even be
associated with actual lowering of prices.
(ii) If a high level of demand occurs, it will complement the
pressure on rising prices when profitability is low but
could be associated with declining prices when profitability
is high. Thus, apart from extensively unexpected demand
due to such factors as wars, the rate of price change when
demand fluctuates depends upon the rate of profits. However,
since recessions (thus low demand) are sometimes associated
with low profit rates, ourBasicHypothesis suggest that
inflationary forces may be operating during periods like
this even if there is lnsufficient aggregate demand to
support it.—22-
This suggests to us that the classification of inflations should be
made to depend upon the rate of profit in the sense that when
R(t) <R*(t)profitability factors may be stronger while when
-.R(t) may dominate.. :
-
Thereason forthe above classification is that when R(t) >H*(t)
then atomistic competitive forces operate and large shifts in demand could
cause price changes. If, however, R(t) <R*(t)thenfluctuations in
demand have far less influence on price changes. In this environment
a correlated price strate,r will usually respond, to any cost increases
by raising prices more than cost in order to close the profitability
gap. We shall refine this classification below.
A very important dimension of ourtheoryis found in its provision
of a critical test to distinguish it from the conventional, static model
of price formation. The usual "auctioneer" model of price formation
predicts that excess demand results in both rising profits and prices
thus establishing a positive association between the rate of inflation
and the rate of profit. Our approach proposes the opposite: a negative
association between the rate of inflation and the rate of profits. This
crucial test will be evaluated below.
3. The Basic Hypothesis and Econometric Specifications
3.a Specification of the Basic Hypothesis
Our "basic hypothesis" stated earlier decomposes the
strategy into two components—23—
(i)the effect of the profitability gap on price changes
(ii)theeffect of the expected change in the profitability
gapif prices are not altered.
This. hypothesis canbe-expressedin--its simplest linear form by an
equation like
-
(3.1) p(t)- p(t- 1)=-') - (t-1)1 + [E(R(t))-R(t-
where
R*(t —1)=thenormal—target profit rate which firms believe
theycouldpotentially earnint —1
R(t —1)=theactual profit rate at t —1
E(R(t)) =theexpected profit rate in t given that product prices
are not changed
The rest of this section is devoted to the development and elaboration
of equation (3.1) above.
Starting with the primitive cQncept of R(t —1),it is defined
by




(3.2a)r(t -1) =(1-t(t))P(tlti)(t -i)
We define
(3.3) R(t -1)r(t -i)+k(t
-1)
where:
—1)=thetax rate at t —1
p(t -1)=priceof output at t —1
Y(t-l)outputleveiat t—i
w(t—i)=wagerateat t—i
L(t —i)=laborinput at t —1
Pk(t —1)=priceof unitofcapital goods at t —1
K(t —i)=capitalstock employed at t —1







The 1 period lag in (3.1) is based on the idea that it takes time
for a firmtoknow its exact level of profitability. In addition,
in order for a correlated strategy to be successfully established—25—
firmswill have to be convinced of the state of their own profitability
as well as the state of profitability of all other firms in the
industry. The profit rate of any given firmmayfluctuate but a
correlated strater will be established only when all firms share the
same environment.
Inthe application below we shall testmodels with 2 period
lagandaKoyck model with a lag of infinite number of periods.
Turning now to R*(t —1)we shall assume that
(3.5) R(t —1)=r*+k(t
—i)
where r* is a constant to be estimated. The justification for
this assumption is based on the simple observation (see Diagram i)
that during the 20th century the post-tax rate of return r(t) fluc-
tuated around a constant and we shall take r* to be related to the long
term mean value of r(t). We thus can combine (3.5) and (3.1) to
obtain
(3.6) [R*(t -1)-R(t-ifl [r* -r(t-ifl
To complete the exposition of equation (3.1) one needs to
considerwhat would happen to the profitability of thefirm ifit
didnot change prices. Thus the expression E(R(t)) is the expected
profit rate when all the variables under the control of the firm
are held constant. More precisely this expression is defined as—26—
(3T) E(H(t)) =r(t—1)
÷ =((t)- w(t -1))
+ =(Et(t-.1)- T(t -1))
+ (Ep(t) Pk(t -1)
+ : (EY(t) -y(t-1))
+ ETrk(t)
Equation (3.7)saysthat E(R(t)) is equal to the profit rate from
operations at Ct —1) (i.e., r(t —1))plus the expected rate
of relative capital gains (Elrk(t)) less the change in the
profit rate induced by changes in the wage rate, the tax rate, the
cost of capital goods andproductivity.
Now from (3.2) we candefine
(3.8a) : (Ew(t) -w(t-1))
















(3.8d) : (Ey(t)- Y(t1))
-(1 (1))P(t
-i)Y(t -1)(EY(t) -Y(t-
1)) —— T t—Pk(tt
—i) Y(t —1)
We think of the three variables defined in (3.8a)—(3.8c) as three cost
changes and t3.8d) as productivity change holding inputs constant.
Combining (3.2), (3.7) and(3.8a)—(3.8d)we obtain
(3.9) [E(R(t))-n(t - 1)]
—r(t1)W(t —l)L(t—i)Ew(t)—t(t — 1)
Pk(t_ 1)K(t — w(t—
-
1r(; ))(Er(t)-t(t-1)













where in (3.9) we use the notation (Ey(t)
—y(t—l))/y(t—i)
toindicate change inproductivity holding factors constant.
No.w,theright hand. sideof (3.9)containsthe expression
{E*k(t)
—rrk(t
—1)]which is the expected change in the relative
rate of capital gains (relative to the rate of inflation). Thus
this is an expectation of the structural relation between the change
in prices of finished products relative to capital goods. Being
essentially a second order effect, this factor may be ignored. How-
ever, it has been observed that during the 20th century
k(t)pk(t)/Pk(t) —p(t)/p(t)has averaged about .89%(see,however,
Kendrick [1976], p. 27). Thus, given the systematic nature of
thisvariable it is reasonable to assume
(3.10) Ek(t) =k(t
—1)
and testthe hypothesis 5 =1.To add a word ofcaution we are not
certainof the meaning of the data for pk(t) which is the implicit
price deflator of the capital stock. The fact that lTk(t)has a
positive rather than 0 mean may suggest that the risein the
price index for pk(t) really represents quality or productivity
changes and assuch should be subtracted fromthe third term of the
expression on the right of (3.9) (i.e., from (Epk(t) _pk(t_1))/pk(t_l)).
Also, if the positive mean of lrk(t) measures qualitychanges it,
shouldreally not he viewedas capital gains on the entire stock—29—
since pk(t) represents the price of the marginal units rather than
the price of the stock. We have elected. to leave the specificatioi
as developed in equation (3.9) since two tests are readily available
to us: by (3.9) all the expressions on the right hand of (3.9) must
have the same coefficient which we shall denote by .Thismeans
that the coefficient of 7rk(t —1)is 8(6 —1)enabling us to
identify 6 and test its difference from 1. We can now summarize
the specification of the basic model. To do that note from (3.2a) that
(3.11) (1 — = r+ (1 -
Thususing (3.11) we obtain
12) (1(t 1))p(t—i)Y(t-l) (EY(t)_(t_1)) 3. —pk(tt y(t—l)
(t 1)(Ey(t)—y(t—l)) + ( ( )w(t1)L(t1) (EY(t).Y(t_1)) —r—
y(t—l) 1—i t_l)p(t_l)K(t_l) y(tl)
Now in order to combine (3.11) and (3.9) define






- Epk(t)Pk(t1)Fr(t)-y(t-l)1 X3 t —r(t-l)[
pk(t1)
—y(t—l)





We shall in factestimate an equation like
())p(t) =- ar(t-1)1x1(t) -2x2(t)
-3x3(t)
-1k(t-i)
butrestrict 1 = = andtest the hypothesis5 =1.
3.b The Effect ofDemaidandtheConcept of. "BasicInflation"
Our theoreticaldevelopment in the previous section indicates
that small fluctuations in demand will result in fluctuations in output
rather than prices. However, this does not contradict the possible
traditional effects on the rate of price changes that may be caused
by fluctuations in excess demand particularly if such fluctuations
are large andunexpectedin intensity and duration. Under the pressure
of fluctuations in excess demand the atoniistic market forces may
complement or weaken the complex process of forming correlated pricing
strategies. Thus what we are stressing here is the fact that factors
of excess demand should be viewed as operating on the rate of inflation
independently of the effects of the profit gap. These two factors
can either intensify or cancel out each other. Since the empirical
analysis which is carried out below covers the period l9O9-l97 one—31—
wouldexpectthat some of the intense fluctuations in excess demand
were important explanatory factors of inflation during the period
of study.
We shall use the unemployment rate u(t) as a proxy measure
of the fluctuations in excess demand and add this variable to
equation (3.13).
The introduction of demand considerations changes, however, the
dynamic structure of equation (3.13). A critical element in the
specification is the assumption of no intercept. It then follows that





-.i).Thus in order to preserve the dynamic interpretation
of (3.13) we need to measure not u(t) by itself but the difference
between u(t) and u*_the normal level of unemployment associated




=0.Under the hypothesis =1we can thus
rewriteourmodel with demand effects in the following form:
(3.15)t)-(t-i)
+y[u(t)—u]
with model (3.15)wecannowdefine the concept of "basic inflation"
b(t) to be
(3.16)b(t) =c4r*—r(t—1)1 + y[u(t)——32—
Sinceneither the target profit rate._r* nor the normal, 0 excess
demand unemployment rate -u are observable it is clear that by
estimating (3.15) with an unrestricted intercept we shall be estimating
the expression
ar*_yu*
and this means that r* and u* are not identifiable. We do have,
however, some idea of what a reasonable range for u can be and in
most of the calculations below we shall assume u =5%and then
estimate the corresponding value of r*.
Apart from the identification issue it is the "basic inflation"
factor b(t) which plays the crucial role in this research and we
need to amplify this point now.
We note first that in the present paper we are not attempting
to explain what pushes wages and other cost in response to change in
output prices. What is proposed here is that even if there were no
expected increase in cost thus x1(t) =x2(t)
=x3(t)
=0there wifl
till be a residual factor, namely the "basic inflation" b(t), which
will continue to exert pressure on prices and in this sense the factors
of the profit gap and excess demand are viewed as causiflg inflation.
Obviously, once the inflationary process gets started the feedback
between prices and wages and other cost may attain a much greater
quantitative weight than the "basic" component of inflation. In order
to understandmore fully the relative importance of the "basic" and
the"feedback" components ofinflationthe present model will need—33—
to be expanded and completed. This we expect to do later. In the
present paper we shall be able to provide a quantitative measure
of the "basic" component.
3.c Other Exogenous Factors
In addition to the unemployment rate as a proxy to fluctuation
inexcess demand we shallalsotest the possible independent effect
of the growth rate of real GNP (i.e. (y(t) —y(t—i)/y(t
—1))since
the rate of unemployment and the growth rate are notperfectly correlated.
Thedata to be used in this study covers the U.S. economy
during the period l9O9_l971 and during this period we isolated
four episodes which could represent special situations:
(1) WW1 =adummy variable taking the value 1 for the
years 1917—1918 measuring the special circum-
stances of the yearsofthe first World War.
(ii) WW2 =adummy variable taking the value 1 for the
war years l9I2_l945 and measuring in fact the
effect of price controls during the war.
(iii) d1 =adummy variable taking the value 1 for the year
l946 to indicate the year in which price controls
were removed.
(iv) d2 =adummy variable taking the value 1 for the
year 1951 to measure the effect of the unexpected
KoreanWar.—34—
3.d Simultaneous Equation Bias
We view the price determination model as part of a larger
system which simultaneously determines the inflation rate, the wage
rate w(t), the output level Y(t), the tax rate T(t), the price of
capital goods pk(t) and the unemployment rate u(t). In the esti-
mation procedure to be used, these are always treated as endogenous
variables to be replaced by corresponding instrumental variables.
The list of exogenous variables used in the estimated first stage
equations is given in the Appendix. In equation (3.9) the expected
values Ew(t), Et(t), Ep(t) and EY(t) are all estimated with an
instrumental variables procedure and are then used in the second
stage for the estimation of the price equation.
1. Estimation and Empirical Results
As indicated earlier we estimate our basic model using annual
U.S. data for l9O9l97'1. The three subsections here will present
the estimates of the basic model and those of variants allowing for
different lag structure and the effect of import prices.
1.a Estimation I: Model (3.15)
Table 1 presents the result of using 2 stage least squares methods
to estimate model (3.15) as discussed above. In choosing the data
for r(t) we examined both the post-tax gross and net rates of return
on capital, the difference between them being the treatment of deprcia—
tion. These two variables are obviously highly correlated and in—35—
Table 1
2SLSEstimatesof Model (3.15)
Gross Rate of Return Net Rate of Return
Variables 1 2 3 1 2 3
Constant .13142
-.1142 .1391 .0533 .014145 .08314
(.0398) (.01409) (.0219) (.0263) (.0269) (.0206)
r(t—1) —1.9070 1.7114]. _2.014614 8226 —.7873 —1.2913
(.56142) (.5865) (.14297) (.3879) (.14016) (.3363)
x1(t) 2.57514 14.0053 14.0212 2.1252 3.1281 3.1237
(.7036). (.141478) (.141462) (.5705) (.3659) (.3rr5)
x2(t) 2.57514 4.0053 14.0212 2.1252 3.1281 3.1237
(.7036) (.14478) (.141462) (.5705) (.3659) (.3775)
x3(t) 2.57514 14.0053 14.0212 2.1252 3.1281 3.1237





u(t) —.4585 —.3382 —.14154 —.3172 —.2312 —.42149'
(.1535) (.1533) (.1219) (.1593) (.1602) (.1366)
Y(t) .014814 .0868 .18142 .2082
Y(t) (.1002) (.1039) (.0941) (.0969)
WW]. .1582 .1272 .1402 .1321 .1128 .1390
(.0308) (.0297) (.0252) (.0281) (.0277) (.0257)
WW2 .0211 .00147 .0105 .00614 —.0087 .0051
(.0175) (.0170) (.0155) (.0180) (.0173) (.0166)
.0167 —.0086 .-.0190 .0137 —.0072 —.0407
(.0353) (.0355) (.0332) (.0370) (o371) (.03147)
a2 —.01145 —.0033 —.ooi6 —.0136 —.00141 .0009




tvaluefor .2983 . .2153 .6287 .2570 .50114 1.14688
81—82
t valuefor .6810 .0998 .4625 1.1393 .0263 .7608
82 =83






r* .058 .057 .058 .o146 .0142 .048
a 1.9070 1.71141 2.014614 .8226 .7873 1.2913
B . 2.57514 14.0053 14.0212 2.1252 3.1281 3.1237
.79148 — — .7793 — —
MeanSquare ..00072 .00080 .00079 .00079 .00085 .00091
Error
p—36—
principleit should matter little which one we select. However, since
the depreciation rate is really an endogenous policy variable,the
net rate of return is influenced by the way accountingmethods of depre-
ciatiOn change over time and the tax treatment of these changes.This
meansthatthe reported net rate of return may provide an inaccurate
picture of the true profitability of the firm. The exampleof accelerated.
depreciation provides a particularly sharp demonstrationhow inappropriate
is the net rate to our purpose. Here accelerated depreciationincreases
the true profitability of the firm due to reduced taxes but itdecreases
thereported after-tax net rate of return on capital. Dueto these
considerations weacceptin this work the gross rate as a basis for
analysisand all the discussion in later sections is based on the results
of the "gross" equations. We present the estimates for the"net" equa—
tions in Table 1 only. Note that as far as the goodness of fit is
concerned the gross rate of return provides a better statistical fit
to models (3.15) and (1.3)below.
We must first dispose of the question of testing the hypothesis
cS =1.The estimated value of Sis .T9148inthe "gross" equation
and.T793inthe "net"equation. Recall from (3.13) that if we denote
the coefficient of lrk(t—1)by y then the truerelationis
(.i) (1-6)=
ByBao's theorem (see Dhrymes[l971], Proposition 6,pages112—113) the
random variable (i—) hasan asymptotic normaldistribution with a




where is the estimated variance covariance matrix of the vector
(y,8).Calculating the standard deviation of (1 —6),we findthatit
is.1291for the "gross" model (thus the t valueis 1.5859)and
.11496 forthe "net" case (resulting in a t value of l.471414). In
eitherone of the two cases 6 is not significantly different from 1.
This leads us to accept the hypothesis 6 =1and. proceed in the rest
of this paper to analyze the model under this restriction. The conclu-
sion to ignore the variable Trk(t —i)is reinforced by our earlier
doubts about its interpretation.
Before proceeding to the analysis of our basic model note the
two variables u(t) and Ay(t)/Y(t). These variables represent the
fluctuations in demand and these are clearly important. The unemploy-
ment variable has a negative coefficient which is statistically signifi-
cant while the growth rate of real output is positive and notsignificant.ui'
Furthermore, since AY(t)/Y(t)iscorrelated with u(t) the removal
of LiY(t)/Y(t) increases the coefficient of u(t) and reduces the
standard errors of other variables. We thus conclude that the effect
of variations in demand on the rate of inflation is statistically
significant and will be represented by the unemployment variable only.
We thus restrict our discussion to equations type 3 in Table 1.—38-
Turning now to the evaluation of the model parameters we note
that in the 'Tgross" equation 3, r .068,=2.0146)4and B =14.0212.
Since the mean value of the gross rate of return r(t) is .051414
the difference between the target r* and .0514)4 is of great interest
and we return to this question later. On the other hand, the basic
restrictions proposed by the model i.e. B1 =B2
=
B3B are justified
by the passage of their significance tests.
The crucial variable of our model is r(t —1)and. as suggested
earlier the essential test of our model is represented by the sign and
size of its coefficient. We find that &= 2.014614representing a
major trade—off between the rate of inflation arid the rate of profits:
for each 1 percentage point variation in the gross profit rate this
model suggests an induced change of 2 percentage points in the inflation
rate. Interestingly enough the value of B is estimated to be around
14, indicating an extremely rapid rate of price reaction to current
changes in the profit rate due to cost. This major difference between
a and B is interesting and we shall return to it below after reviewing
all the eniprical results. The net effect of fluctuations in demand
is interesting. The unemployment rate has a significant net negative
effect on the rate of inflation and the estimate of —.141514 is important.
It suggests that in order to reduce the inflation rate by 1 percentage
point the unemployment rate will need to rise by 2.14 percentage points!
This is a much more extreme trade—off than is familiar from the Phillips
curve literature.
Finally the dummy variables describing the "special" episodes
contribute little except for the first world war. We find this to be—39—
anencouraging result suggesting that the variations in the rate of
inflation are well explained by the other variables of the model.
l.b Estimation II: The Indirect Effect of Import Cost
Our theory of endogenous inflation rate relates to the prices
of all domestically produced commodities over which producers have
control. The variable which measures this rate of inflation is.
the GNP deflator which measures the price index of domestic
value added. Because of this we used the GNF price deflator for p(t)
and the GNP itself for y(t). It is crucial to note that the GNP
deflator is totally unresponsive to the direct changes in import prices.
To see this note that nominal GNP is the sum of consumption, investment,
governmentexpenditures and exports minus imports. If the price of
imports rises while all quantities do not change then both the nominal
aswell as the real GNP do not change explaining why the deflator is
not directly sensitive to the changes in the price of imports.
The critical observation which should be made is that changes in the
prices of imports could influence the prices of domestic value added only
via their effects on profitability. Thus, if we think of all imports as
if they were producer goods used in the production of domestic commodities,
then we can define "output" by the expression
=consumption+investment+governnentexpenditures +exports
and think of p asthe price deflator of this quantity. On this basis




(14.2) r(t) = (1-
where
pim(t) =priceof import goods
i(t) =volumeof imports
p(t)=theprice deflator of the aggregatevalue of consumption,
investment,government expenditures and exports.
Since pis a domestic price which is controlled bydomestic producers
we think of it as an endogenouSvariable and do not assume that any
change in the price of importsshould necessarily induce a corresponding
change in p. We can thus concludethat a rise in pim(t) ——the price
of imports—-without changing domestic priceswill not change the GNP
orthe price deflator but it will reducetotal profits! This suggests
that ourtheoryof domestic inflation should considerthe effect of
changes in the price of imports notin terms of the direct effect of
import prices on commodity pricesin the domestic markets, but rather
in terms of the indireç effect ofsuch price changes on domestic
profitability. To accomplish this weneed to redefine model (3.13) with
the aid of definition (14.2). To do this,define_14_



















Table 2 presents the results of estimating equation(l.3). A comparison
of Tables 1 and 2 indicates that the estimatesof r, ct and are basi-
cally the same except that the mean square errorin Table 2 is some 35%
lower than in Table 1 and the standard errors ofthe coefficients are much
lower. Thusthe estimates of model (.3) suggests an improvementin effi-
ciency overmodel (3.13). It is also encouragingthat the basic test of the
restrictions l == 3= = leads to accepting all of them. We
have separately tested the null hypothesis 1=2
=while
and unrestricted. We find that the F test of the hypothesis
=2
=3
= againstno restrictions leads to the acceptance
of the equality of all the 3•Table 2
2SLS Estimates of Model ()4.3) with Import Variable




























tvalue for 2 =3 .1348
t value for = .14832







MeanSquare Error .00053.)4 3_
cEstimation III: The Lag Structure and. SerialCorrelation
The "profitgap" in equation (3.11)is defined by [r—r(t—ifl.
If firms take longer than 1 period to establishwhat the profit rate
iswe mayreplacer(t —1)by an expression r(t —1)defined by
J
r(t-l)ir(t-l-i) j=l
The need for a longer lag structure mayalso arise from the time it
takes to establish a correlated price strateJ.However the results in
Table 3 which give the estimates for J2 suggestthat a longer lag
is not needed.
We have also tested a Koyck type distributed lagin which =
0<X<1. The results were inconsistent and.unsatisfactory convincing
us to reject the possibility of J=
Thefactthat the profit-lag is short suggests that firms
establishtheirpricing strategies rather quickly. Thisconclusion
is particularly interesting in view of the longduration of an infla—
tionary process. The conclusion of short ratherthan long profit lags
raises the possibility of no lag at all suggesting todefine the
profit gap by the expression [r* —r(t)1.We have rejected this
formulation as inappropriate for our theory and the reasonis now given.
In order to think of the profit gap as a formation of
a price adjusting correlated strategy theremust be a time lag between
the observations made on the profit rate and theactual price adjustment.Table 3
2SLSEStimates of Model (14.3)vith Longer Lag Structure
GrossRate of Reti.rn



































t value for 83 = .17140
Fvalue for 82 =8= .0272
against no restrictions
EstimatedModel Parameters




This time lag measures the rate at which information flows among firms
and decisions are made. Given the fact that it takes firmsasignifi—
cant amount of time to discover their own profit rate and even longer
to establish the profit rates of their competitors it is clear that
some time lag must be allowed and in the context of our theory the
profitrate of a firm and its price adjustment strater cannot possibly
be assumed to be simultaneously determined. What may cause a problem
is the annual structure of our data and the possibility that the time
lag is less than one year. If one goes to the other extreme and assumes
notime lag, then, holding all othervariables constant, the definition
ofr(t) in (3..2a) or (14.2) establishes in the annual data used here
an accounting identity between r(t) and p(t). With this, no
causal relationship between them wouldmakeanysense.Inspite of our
ownreasonsto reject the no lag model the interested reader mayfind
in Table 14 the results for the simultaneous equations estimates of
model (14.3) with no lag. However, the main objective of Table 14 is
to present the results of reestimating model (14.3) with a correction
for serial correlation. The procedure adopted here is based on Fair
[1910] (Section 3).
As Table 14 shows, the results for the one year lag model with
full correction for serial correlation are very similar to the results
inTable 2.Table l
2LSEstimatesfor Model (1.3)withImport Variable
Gross Rate of Return, Correction for Serial Correlation


























p—Autoregressive parameter —.2396 —.3902
(.1223) (.n6o)
EstimatedModel Parameters
r* (with u =.05) .060 .027
1.91412 —.3886
3.5929 3.5508
Mean Square Error .00014142 .000658.—4 7—
5. Implicationsof the Empirical Results
This section will draw a few of the immediate implications of our
results. Deeper analysis relating to a general equilibrium model of
the U.S. economy will be postponed to another paper.
5.a The Trade—Off between Inflation and Profitability
The stochastic form of (li.3) can be written in the following way:
(5')p(t)-p(t-l)=[r*r(tl)]+B[Ep(R(t))R(t_l)I+Y[u(t)u*]
+Y1wl+Y2w2+13d1+yd2+c(t)
In order to isolate the effect of the "profit gap" [r* —r(t—in






Thus i(t)isthe inflation rate corrected for all the variables except
for the profit gap. Now given the estimates of r*, a, y, 2' 3
and we calculate (t)—-the estimated value of (t) and plot
it against r(t —1).Using the equation (-i..3) with imports, Diagram 4
presentsthe scatter for the gross rate of return equation. The scales
of(t) and r(t —1)are the same so that the slope of the scatter
is the actual slope measured by c. One notes that the negative
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Diagram 1
Gross Rate of ReturnClearly every percentage point change in the profit gap causesa
2.0345 percentage point change in the inflation rate whichis measured
by the GNPdeflator.This is a large effect and. a major trade off
indeed.
5.b The Rate of Basic Inflation
Let us disregard, for the moment, the variables wi, ww2,dl
and d2 and write the estimated model in the following way:
(5.1) =2.O3S[r*_r(t_l)]+3.T3T[EP(B(t))(t)]_6T[u(t)_u*}
Then one can see that the implied relationship betweenr* and u









keep in mind that u* is important to our model onlyto the extent
that it is a proxy for the condition of no excessdemands. If we could
observe excess demands directly, we would haveestimated the model with
this variable and would have derived the target profitrate from it
as proposed above in (5.1).—50--
Thekey explanatory variablein our theory is the "basic inflation"
rate defined in (3.16) andis estimatedto be
b(t) .i1i6 —2.0345r(t—1)—.l6Tu(t)
In practice it is this variable which is the focus of this research
since itmeasuresthe basic inflationary pressures which are present
evenwithout the feedback of the cost—price spiral. To understand
this, point note again that in this paper we are not attempting to
explain what pushes tip wages and other cost. What we have established
is that even ifwetake the cost increases as given, there are basic
inflationary forces at work even ifcostsdo not rise. Since the "basic
inflation" measures these forces ithasthe character of being a cause
forinflation.To indicate the relative importance of the "basic
inflation"as an explanatory factor of total inflation let us calculate
itforrecent years:
Year Inflation Basic Basic Inflation as a
Rate Inflation Fraction of Total
1967 2.9% —.2% —6%
1968 ]4.5 .7 16
1969 5.0
1.6 ' 32
1970 5.)4 2.0 37
1971 5.1 2.1
1972 li.l 1.7
1973 5.9 2.0 3)4
19714 9.7 1.5 15—51—
5.cThe Adjustment Rates
Since both [r* —r(t—i)]and [E(R(t)) —R(t—i)]measure
profitability gaps (in percentages) one would expect a and to
be similar in magnitude. It is an interesting fact that our
estimate of a is about 2 while the estimate for is about 3.7.
Thisresult means that a change in the profit rate due to changes in
current cost induces a response which is almost twice as fast as the
response to an accumulation of factors (some random) which resulted in
inequality between r* and r(t —i).Putting this same thing differently
there is a significant difference between adjusting prices in response
to changes in cost which provide an observed signal to a]], and adjusting
prices in response to an accumulation of factors which create a
profitability gap. In view of the delicate process of forming a
pricing strater this result is not totally surprising.
Thebasic explanation to the phenomenon at hand is related to
theway information is passed among the participants in the market and to
the way it is being perceived. Rising cost is a very simple and uniform
signalwhich is clearly seen and understood by alland wouldthus generate
a uniform response regardless whether r* >r(t)or r* <r(t).On
theother hand the existence of a profit gap will induce a more subtle
and complex process and there are three main reasons why the estimated
a may be smaller than :
(1) it takes time for information to pass and to have all the
participants agree to adhere to a price adjustment strategy.—52—
During such a transition period there will be no observ-ed
response to a profitability gap
(ii) since the process involves some uncertainties, even after
the adoption of a price adjustment strategy the tendency
wouldbeto move slowly and to check that all are following
the strategy.If prices are raised too fast some participants
may be reluctant to follow due to the risk involved
(iii) the estimated coefficient a represents average reponses
when r* >r(t)and r* <r(t).It is possible that when
r(t) >r*the response tends to be slower than when r* >r(t)
in which case the mean can be smaller than .
5.dClassification of Inflations
Although we have made little use of the distinction between cost—
push and demand-pull inflations we do think that periods of rapid price
changes can be classified into different categories. However, in using
our modelfor that purpose we have a slight terminological problem since
boththe profit gap [r* —r(t—1)]and theexpected gap {E(R(t)) —
R(t—i)]are influenced by cost. For this reason we shall not use the
terminologyof "cost—push" inflation.
We suggestthat an interesting classification of inflations can
be made by comparing the contribution of demand, measured by the rate of
unemployment, with the contributions of the profit gap [r* —r(t—ifl
to the inflation rate. If an inflation or a deflation is dominated by
demand we say that it is "demand induced" and if it is dominated by
theprofit gap we say that it is "profitability induced."—53—
To do this define
(t) = 2.03l15[r* —r(t—1)]withr* = .0579
d(t) = .l67[u* —u(t)] with u = .05
Here %(t) measures the inflationary pressures due to profitability
and c(t) measures the pressures due to demand. On this basis we
suggest the following classification:
(i) Demand Induced Inflation: ifd(t)
>(t),(t) >0and
)(t)/p(t) >0
(ii) Demand Induced Deflation: if t) <(t),(t) <0and
(t)/p(t)< 0
(iii) Profitability Induced Inflation: if (t) >(t), t(t) > 0
and(t)/p(t) > 0
(iv)Profitability Induced Deflation: if (t) < d(t),(t) <0
and (t)/p(t) <.0.
If an inflationary period does not satisfy any of the above we
shallcall it "ambiguous." Onthe other hand if d(t) and
havethe same sign but arewithin .5ofeach other we shall classify such
aperiod as "both" because the classificationdepends upon the selection
ofthe unemployment rate u and we certainly regard the selection of
=.05as arbitrary.
Inthe analysis below we consider allyearsduring l9O9—l9T4 in
which p(t)/p(t)exceeded 3% in absolute value. The tables record the
values of (t), d(t) and the implied classification.We may note that the period 1911-1922 appears to have very irregular
variations in the price level aridinthe estimated model (1i.3)thedummy
variablefor the first world war is significant with a coefficient of
ii.8%.Thusa good part of the inflation in this period seemsto be














1915 3.2 —1.58 +2.22
•
Profitability induced
1916. 12.8 —.05 —.37 Ambiguous
1911 23.2 ÷18 —3.72 Demand induced
1918 16.5 +1.62 —8.09 Demand induced
1919 2.5 +1.62 —8.16 Demand induced
1920 13.9 —.09 Ambiguous
1921 —i4.8 -.3.02 —.31 Demand induced
1922 —5.5 —.77 +1.75 Demand induced
1923 2.8 +1.17 +2.3k
.Profitabilityinduced
Period 2: 1929_19140
Year p(t)/p(t) (t —i) Classification of Price Chang
1930 —2.6% —i.6i —.59 Demand induced
1931 —9.1 1.6)- 1.08 Demand induced
1932 —10.3 —7.88 2.95 Demand induced
1933 —2.2 —7.02 6.27 Demand induced
1934 7J 6.8 Profitabilityinduced
1935 .9 —)-l.14 5.21 Profitabilityinduced
1936 .2 —2.21 3.97 Profitabili.tyinduced
1937 1.2 —1.85 3.07 Profitabilityinduced
1938 —.1 —3.38 3.01 Demand induced—55-.
This period is interesting in the fact that during 1930—1938 demand
forces appear to exert pressures on price declines while profitability
wasexerting pressures on prices to rise. The outcome appears to be
divided: the early period (1930-1933) exhibits the domination of demand
factors while thelater period shows the domination of profitability
factors.This period provides unusual demonstration of the key element
of our theory: inspiteofa 16% unemployment rate in 1931i. inflation
was proceedingat an annual rate of7.14%(!)andthe low profitability
of that era is the important factor in explaining it.
Period 3: 19111—1967
During this period the effects of price controls during the war
and theeffects of removingthe controls in l9l1.6—l1.7——all cause a slight
distortion; the high inflation rate in 19146_l1.T is a bit abnormal and is
mostly explained by the rapid rise in wages immediately after the war
Year p(t)/p(t) d(t) (t)
Classificationof Price Changes
191.1.1 7.5% —.11.5 +2.11.0 Profitability induced
1911.2 12.3 +.86 1.95 Profitability induced
1911.3 7.0 +1.11.11. —.39 Demand induced
191414 2.6 +1.71 _2.11.11. Demand induced
l945 2.6 +1.140 —14.52 Demand induced
19146 11.7 +.50 —3.50 Demand induced
191.1.7 12.8 +.50 +1.20 Profitability induced
19)48 6.9 +.514 +1.79 Profitability induced
1951 6.8 +1.2)4 Both
1956 3.1 +J11 +•77 Both
1957 3.14 +.32 —.143 Demandinduced—56—
Period 14:1968_19114
Year (t)/p(t) (t) Classification of Price Chang
1968 14.5% +.63 +.08 Demand induced
1969 5.0 +.68 +.85 Both
1970 5.14 +.05 +1.19 Profitability induced
1971 5.1 —.141 +2.314 Profitability induced
1972. 14.1 —.27 +1.89 Profitability induced
1973 5.9 +.05 +1.73. Profitability induced
19714 97. —.27 +1.69 Profitability induced
The most distinct feature of the 1966—19714 period is the sharp decline
of the profit rate from the peak of 6.2% in 1966 to 14.5% in 19714.
Our model suggests that by 1970 the rate of price increase switched
from being demand induced to being profitability induced.
5.6 The Anatomy of Inflation 1971-1977
We now use model (14.3) to predict the inflation rates for the
period 1975-1971. Since we do not have updated informationfor all the
independent variables used in the first stage, we shall usein the
predictions below the actual italues of the variables on the righthand
side of (14.3). In order to aid the comparability of the results we
also present the corresponding values for the period 1971—19714 the data
for which was used in the estimation.
Table 5 presents the results. One may note that apart from
l974-1915 the prediction error is not large. The negative error in
19714 resulted from the fact that the model responded to the large
cost increases in 19714 faster than the economy. Thus it took the—57--
Table 5
Analysis ofInflation1971—197T
economy an extra year to absorb the extra—ordinarily highrate of
10.7%wage increase and 50.b% increase in the unit priceof imports.
Due to thistemporary adjustment period the model prediction is above
the actual rate in l971 and below the actual rate in 1975.
The analysis shows that the profit gap has accounted consistently
for some 2—2.5 percentage points of the inflation rate duringthis period.
The effect of demand has been more volatile arid so has beenthe cost
components. It is perhaps worth indicating that the2.27% contributions
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ofimports in 1974should be understood tomean that the rise of import
cost, in. causing a potential decline in the profitrate has induced a
price increase in the domestic valueadded of GNP due simply to the sub-
stitutability between imported and domestic commodities.This should not
be confused with the direct increase in the pricelevel due to the direct
increase in the imported component of the price index resultingfrom
the rise of import prices. Such a component does not existin the
GNPdeflatorand. is excluded from analysis here.
Using our earlier classification, the inflation of 1971—1977
wouldcertainlybe viewed as profitability induced. Clearly the com-
ponent which we called "basic inflation" hascontributed significantly
during this period as the following shows:
Basic Inflation as








Whatis interesting here is that the fraction of basicinflation in the
total falls from 1971 to 1975 and then rises again.This is partly
caused by the recorded unemployment rate which has undergonestructural
changes due to the labor supply of women and teen—agers.This factor—59--
really causes a distortion of the explanator?T powerof unemployment to
inflation. However the observed pattern may also suggestthat once
theinflationary process starts it tends to become dominated bythe
feedback component. We note that by 1975 the basic inflation component
has declined to 11% of the total and one might suggestthat the rise
ofthis component after 1975 would represent a resurgenceof inflationary
forcesbeyond 1977.
Clearly these are only conjectures which needmuch further study
and whose investigation will require a general equilibriumsetting.
We expect to complete this work later on.
Finally let us consider the evolution, in the 1970's,of the
profit and unemployment rates:







Comparingthesefigures to those in Diagram 1it should be clear that
theprofit rate in the 1970's has been abnormallylow.Withthisrate
around14.9%and the unemployment rate in 1978—1979 going dowitothe
5.8%range, therate of inflation due to low profitability remains
around2.03%which constitutes some 140% of totaldomestic value added
inflation in the 1970' s excluding the extraordinarY yearsof 19114—1975.—6o—
Thismeans that as long as the profit rate remains abnormally low the
basicinflationary pressures will persist and. be intensified by a
public policy to expand demand in order to lower the unemployment
rate. The converse of this observation is equally clear: any public
policy aiming to reduce inflation will not be successful unless it
is also directed towards raising the profit rate on private capital.
For this same reason no compulsory price control program can reduce
inflation if it prevents the profit rate from rising. We expect to study
other policy implications of this theory after a further study of the
t?feedback inflation" mentioned earlier.Appendix
W(t)L(t): Labor Income Before Taxeswascalculated by adding total






D. Creamer [1956], Table Al, pageii6.




(I) The key variables of this study will be listed belowanda brief
reference to the data sources will be made.
Y(t): RealGNP: for1909—1928; The Economic Almanac,theConference
Board1960.
for 1929-1912; National Income andProduct Accounts
ofthe United States 1929l9714,B.E.A., 1975
for 1973—1977; The Economic Report of the President,'1918.
P(t): the GN Deflator: for 1909-1928; LongTermEconomic Growth, Census
Bureau, l95, series B62.
forl929—1945; Long Term Economic Growth, Census
Bureau, 1965, series B63.
for19146—1912; Economic Report of the President,
1976.






For the Self Employed Component we imputed the mean rate of
compensation for the employed. The data for the number of self
employed was obtained from
1909—1928; D. Creamer [1956], Table Bl—B, pp. 131—132.
1929—1965;NationalIncome andProductAccounts of the United
States 1929—1965, OBE, 1966.
1966—1913; Survey of Current Business, July 1970, 1976.
l974-l977; ourcalculations. Dataavailable on request.
L(t): Total Labor Employed. Total number of persons engaged in
production multiplied by the number of weekly hours.
For the number of persons engaged use exactly the samesources
asprovided above. For the weekly rate of hours worked an
analytical procedure was devised which integrated the following
sources:
1909—1953; LongTerm EconomicGrovth,1965,Series B6.
195)4—1965;
U 11 U U U "B7.
1966—191)4;BLS, Earnings andEmployment inthe U.S. i969—197.
1975—1977; Monthly Labor Review, B.L.S., Department of Labor,
October 1918.
U(t): UnemploymentRate:
1909—1930;Historical Statistics of the U.S.,Census Bureau, 1976.
1931—19)43; Darby, M. [1916].
19)4)4—1910;Historical Statistics of the U.S., Census Bureau, 1916.
1971—1974; The Economic Report of the President, 1976.
1975—1977;B.L.S.,MonthlYLabor Review,October 1978.—63—
k(t)1c(t),
K(t.): The Nominal andReal Capita].Stock. An analytical
procedure was applied to synthesize information from the
following sources:
Goldsmith, R. [1915]
Survey of Current Business: December1972, April 1976,
September 1978
Economic Report of the President, 1978
Tice, H. S. [1967]
Kendrick, J.W. [1976]
ConstructionReview, Department of Commerce, November 1978
The final data appears at the end of this appendix.
Pim(t)Im(t): Nominal Value of Imports
1909—1970: Historical Statistics of the U.S., 1976, Series U219.
1971—1977; Economic Report of the President, 1978.
P (t): Index of Import Prices
—Im-———
1909—1970;Historical Statistics of the U.S. 1976.
1971—1977; Survey of Current Business, various issues.
t(t): The Average Tax Rate. This variable measures the ratio of
total taxes paid by all economic agents to GNP. Due to the
complexity of all the sources used for the different taxes a
detail description all these public sources will be omitted.
The actual data used will appear below.
(ii) The Independent Variables Used in the First Stage
(1) %ofU.S. population under 18 years of age
(2)%oflabor force unionized(3) Lengthof time since the tottom of previous recession
(Ii) %changein import prices





(9)Themeannumberof weekly hours of work
(10) Real per-capita wealth (including the governmentdebt held by
by the public)
(II) Time
(12) %ofthe population residing in cities with 100,000or more
(13) A variable measuring the distribution ofwealth
(14) The other exogenous variables appearingin equation .3)in
the text.
(Iii) Special Data Tables
As noted above some variables were eitherconstructed by us or
significant analytical work was performedin their construction. These
we provide directly—65—

















1909 tj7.75 141.94 0.0710311 0.052973
1910 1219.98 147.61 0,0633981 0.056685



































1921 1463.08 377.25 0.0492788 0.08,3927
1922 1492.85 351.03 0.0464258 0.092360
1923 1542.89 381.22 0.0574245 0.084320
1924 1590.92 396.43 0.0548589 0.086709
1925 1660.08 411.07 0.0557538 0.090500











1929 1879.48 456.81t 0.0607732 0.124581
1930 1879.39 426.50 0.0526321 0.113692
1931 1862.44 374.04 0.0433573 0.120503
1932 1821.98 333.36 0.0270927 0.149064
1933 1794.73 342.02 0.0246344 0.162242
1934 1775.53 352.51 0.0323269 0.153480
1935 1764.50 358.33 0.0383520 0.149769
1936 1765.64 381.76 0.0428392 0.154545
1937 1775.06 401.85 0.0430776 0,167913 138 1764.39 400.10 0.0413190 0.170299
1939 1763.56 408.19 0.0439655 0.lôlc,91
1940 1782.92 434.40 0.0461260 0.171990
1941 1811.18 484.20 0.0483211 0.200053
1942 1813.31 524.35 0.0597262 0.202069
1943 1798.82 553.31 0.0698775 0.246753
1944 1784.67 579.15 0.0801124 0.230485










1948 1893.78 918.58 0.0553948 0.2256o8
1)49 1931.55 946.74 0.0540054 0.216028
1950 2004.95 1050.71 0.0517555 0.239086
1)51 2075.35 1156.19 0.0541792 0.257153
1952 2131.88 1208.44 0.0522255 0.259335
1953 2187,35 1252.40 0.0509079
1954 2241.78 1301.30 0.0520941 0.244.376
l9ss 2321.83 1397.02
• 0.0541358 0.251555 1- 2393.17 1503.35 0.0600306 0.256982
19D7 2459.03 1591.79 0.0498152 0.258050 19' 2509.67 1670.60 0.0505429 0.251102
1)5? 2587.90 1756.88 0.0509120 0.263604.
19.>0 2o52.81 1820.70 0.0438845 0.272632
1)&L 2706.55 1874.60 0.0503416 0.2711ó9 162 2783.75 1945.64 0.0547267 0.2721,33 ij 2B63.02 2028.30 0.0550507 0.275942
i. 2950.57 2122.02 0.0563339 0.268425
Jj:j 3033,87 2242.06 0.0593158 0.26d4'U i 3162.14 2384.34 0.3615956 0.275225 19F 3259.35 2576.96 0.0583378 0.280415
19o5 3364.82 2851.16 0.0537171 0.297212
3480.74 3145.51 0.0491173 0.309958
1)70 579.82 3383.38 0.0454400 0.299470
1971 3650.60 3631.65 0.0485605 0.294324
1972 1817.06 3984.05 0.0493918 0.303612 iii 3)85.58 4537.25 0.0491536 0.051i2









0.307s58 (7 4301.83 6994.20 0.0487531 0.31L55o—66—
Footnotes
1/ We are using the example of Perry [1966]equations(5.2)—(5.3).
More accurately Perry identifies p(t) with the consumer price













p (t) =priceof manufactured goodsat t
p5(t)price of services at t
=priceofrawfoods at t
p(t) =priceof raw materials at t
=indexof capacity utilization at t
2/ This is also the point made by Saznuelson—SoloW [1960].
3/ This same fact is true in a general competitive economy with a
continuum of agents who are small, but with a finite number of firms.
14/ Clearly the most important punishment is the withdrawal of the
gain once it has been attained. Here we mean punishment above
and beyond that.
5/ Thedistinction between r andRwill be clarified later. Here
r is defined as the after tax aggregate profits divided by the
nominal value of the aggregate capital stock.
6/ Clearly for all prices below p(t) the demand elasticity is
less than 1.
7/ It is significant in the "net" equation 2.—6'r—
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